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Abstract
This paper investigates the eﬀects of monetary rewards from commercialisation
on the pattern of research. We build a simple repeated model of a researcher ca-
pable to obtain innovative ideas. We analyse how academic and market incentives
aﬀect the allocation of the researcher’s time between research and development. We
argue, however, that technology transfer objectives also aﬀect the choice of research
projects. Although commercialisation incentives reduce the time spent in research,
they might also induce researchers to conduct research that is more basic in nature,
contrary to what the “skewing problem” would presage. Monetary rewards induce a
more intensive search for (ex-post) path-breaking innovations, which are more likely
to be generated through (ex-ante) basic research programs. These results are shown
to hold even if development delays publication.
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1 Introduction
The industrial base of many advanced economies relies heavily on public science, i.e.
knowledge that originates from universities and other public research institutions (Narin
et al., 1997 and McMillan et al., 2000). The prominent role of universities implies that any
change in the research environment is (and should be) widely debated. The Bayh-Dole
Act, which gave American universities the right to own and license inventions emanating
from federally funded research, has certainly been no exception. Since the enactment of
this law more than twenty years ago, patenting by universities, together with licensing
agreements and revenues, has increased dramatically. The 86 universities responding to
the Association of University Technology Managers survey in 1991 and 1998, for example,
reported an increase in patent applications of 176 percent and licenses executed of 131
percent (Jensen et al., 2003).1
Many people have seen this surge in patenting and licensing as a great benefit to soci-
ety. Others, however, worry about the long-term side-eﬀects of the Bayh-Dole act. Voices
have been raised in a variety of societal forums opposing changes that might endanger
the “intellectual commons” and the practices of open science (see e.g., Nelkin, 1984).
Because only private information can be patented, researchers might not be able to pub-
lish preliminary results until a patent application has been filed. This can be delayed
further into the licensing process as firm contracts with universities often include delay
of publication clauses.2 Some other groups have expressed concerns about the possibility
that commercial rewards might also be aﬀecting the choice of research projects, “skewing”
research from basic towards more applied (Florida and Cohen, 1999).3 After the costs
are recovered, the royalty income is divided between the university’s transfer oﬃce, the
faculty members listed as inventors and their departments. In many of these agreements
1In recent years, in a large number of EU countries an increase in patenting has also been closely
following the transfer of ownership of patents to universities (Geuna and Nesta, 2006).
2One half of the firms surveyed by Thursby and Thursby (2007) noted that they include delay of
publication clauses in at least 90% of their university contracts.
3Survey results by Blumenthal et al. (1986) indicate that faculty members whose research is supported
by the industry are four times more likely than faculty without such support to report that their choices
of research topics have been aﬀected by the chance that the results would have commercial application.
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the faculty can receive as much as 50% of the total royalty revenue.4
Still, many directors of technology transfer oﬃces believe that substantially less than
half of the inventions with commercial potential are disclosed to their oﬃces (Jensen et
al., 2003). Some of them may not be disclosed because the inventor is not able to realise
the potential commercial value but in many other cases the inventor does not want to take
time away from research. Faculty involvement in commercial development is necessary for
businesses to be interested in licensing university inventions, since most of the innovations
licensed are at an early stage of development (Jensen and Thursby, 2001). And, researchers
are not only driven by monetary rewards, as other non-academic entrepreneurs, but also
by peer recognition and the “puzzle” joy (Stephan and Levin, 1992). Academic freedom
to define research topics and methods has high importance for faculty members even if
they lack applicability in the short run. Preferences for research are reinforced by the
academic tenure process and the reward and merit systems that put the emphasis in
scientific publications.
This paper proposes a framework to analyse the eﬀects of monetary rewards from
commercialisation on the pattern of research. We build a simple repeated model of a
researcher capable to obtain innovative ideas. In each period, the researcher might decide
to undertake new research, generating thus a new idea. Each idea has both academic and
potential commercial value, in line with recent evidence that shows that a single piece of
knowledge may contribute to both scientific research and useful commercial applications
(the “Pasteur’s quadrant”).5 Alternatively, she may decide to work in collaboration with
a firm and develop prior research into a commercially valuable innovation. If she does
so, however, the researcher forgoes the opportunity of undertaking new research and
therefore of receiving a new idea in that period. We analyse, in the first place, how
4Lach and Schankerman (2003) provide strong empirical support for the importance of inventor’s
royalty shares for university performance in terms of inventions and license income.
5This line of research started with Stokes’ (1997) famous treatise, “Pasteur’s Quadrant”. The canoni-
cal example is the French chemist Louis Pasteur, who, acting as a consultant for the French wine industry,
confirmed the germ theory of disease. Murray (2002) provides a more recent case study of the “onco-
mouse”, a discovery that was both a product and fundamentally aﬀected the pace and direction of genetic
cancer research. Following Murray (2002) and Murray and Stern (2007) we posit that papers and patents
encode the same piece of knowledge.
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academic and market incentives aﬀect the allocation of researcher’s (fixed amount of)
time between research and development. Not surprisingly, higher commercial rewards
induce the researcher to develop more and therefore to spend less time on research.
We argue, however, that technology transfer objectives also aﬀect the choice of re-
search projects within the researchers’ discipline. At least according to one measure,
researchers should have incentives to conduct more basic research, contrary to what the
“skewing problem” would suggest. Indeed, we show that the introduction of commer-
cial rewards prompts researchers to increase the search for high-quality path-breaking
(ex-post) ideas , which are more likely to be generated through (ex-ante) riskier research
programs. Although risk is associated with all forms of research, high uncertainty is an
inherent characteristic of basic research. As Nelson (1959) states in his seminal paper,
“the line between basic scientific research and applied scientific research is hard to draw.
There is a continuous spectrum of scientific activity. Moving from the applied-science end
of the spectrum to the basic-science end, the degree of uncertainty about the results of
specific research projects increases”. Therefore our model shows that although commer-
cial incentives induce faculty to spend less time doing research, they might also prompt
researchers to select scientific projects that are more basic in nature.
Although the choice of research projects cannot be measured directly, existing indi-
rect evidence suggests that the much-feared switch from basic to applied research is not
occurring. Thursby and Thursby (2002) conclude that changes in the direction of fac-
ulty research seem to be relatively less important than other factors in explaining the
increased licensing activity. Using faculty-level data from six major universities, Thursby
and Thursby (2007) find no systematic change in the proportion of publications in basic
versus applied journals between 1983 and 1999.6 They also report that the total number
of publications per faculty member more than doubled over the time period, indicating
that the number of publications in basic journals has actually increased. A decrease in
the quality of university patents could also be taken as an indication of a trend towards
more applied research. Although Henderson et al. (1998) do find a decreasing trend in
the quality of university patents (measured by the number of forward citations), Mowery
6Hicks and Hamilton (1999) also found that the percentage of basic research that was performed at
American universities remained unchanged between 1981 and 1995.
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et al. (2001), Mowery at al. (2002) and Mowery and Ziedonis (2002) argue that this is
due to an increased number of new and inexperienced technology transfer oﬃces rather
than to a systemic change in the nature of academic research.
Our framework generates comparative statics results that are consistent with a variety
of stylised facts related to individual characteristics such as age and tenure and other
characteristics such as discipline. The model also allows us to examine further implications
and suggest additional tests. We extend for example our basic model to analyse the eﬀects
of increased secrecy, the inability to publish results until the end of the development
period. We compare how the allocation of time and the selection of research projects
change with respect to the case in which development does not delay academic publication.
We show that although the researcher develops less often than without secrecy, she might
still select projects that are riskier. Therefore, the introduction of commercial incentives
might induce research that is more basic in nature, even if development delays publication,
albeit the eﬀect should be weaker than without delay.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that models the impact of the
introduction of commercial incentives on the choice of research projects. It is important
to note that we are concentrating on early-stage academic research. Aghion et al. (2005),
instead, study the respective advantages and disadvantages of academia and the private
sector at diﬀerent stages and show that university researchers are more eﬀective at an
early stage.7 Closer to our work, Lacetera (2006b) compares the incentives of academic
and industrial researchers to perform additional research into a given project prior to
commercialisation. In contrast, this paper concentrates on the choice between undertak-
ing new research and spending time in development and commercialisation of existing
research.8 Thursby et al. (2005) analyse the impact of licensing on the time spent on
basic and applied research in a life cycle context. They show that basic research does not
need to suﬀer from licensing if basic and applied research eﬀort are complementary. In
7Using a closely related model Lacetera (2006a) studies firms’ determinants to outsource research
projects to academic organisations, focusing instead on duration and breadth.
8Several papers have analysed the relations between the university and the industry. Macho-Stadler
et al. (1996) and Jensen and Thursby (2001) for example analyse the optimal contract between the
university and the company. Our development period is a reduced form of this relationship. It bundles
together development time, finding a buyer and so on.
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our model, we show that even if applied research does not improve future basic research
outcomes, researchers might choose projects that are more basic in nature.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic
model. Section 3 analyse the allocation of time and Section 4 the choice of research
projects. Section 5 extends the basic model to accommodate the eﬀects of increased se-
crecy. Finally, Section 6 concludes. The proofs of Section 5 are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model
Consider the following repeated model of a risk-neutral researcher. In each period, she
spends her time either doing research or being involved in further development of prior
knowledge. If she pursues research she obtains, at the end of the period, an “idea” of
random quality q, drawn from an independent and identical distribution F (q) with density
f(q) and support [0, Q].9 Our formulation thus emphasises the fact that the outcome of
any research project is inherently uncertain. In line with the recent literature in the
economics of science (Murray and Stern, 2007), the research output has both academic
value and potential market value. The academic content is publishable in a scientific
journal and it does not jeopardise further patent rights.10 The researcher derives a utility
of αq, where α denotes the marginal benefit of the quality of the publication to the
researcher. This parameter may reflect the tenure or recognition concerns or the possibility
to obtain funding from public grants.
In the following period, the researcher may undertake a new research project and
obtain, at the end of the period, a new idea. Alternatively, she might decide to spend
time in the commercial development of the previous period’s output, which might involve
patenting and finding and collaborating with a licensing firm to develop a commercially
valuable innovation. At the end of the development period, the commercial value of an
9Eﬀort and capacity issues are given and subsumed in the support and in the distribution. In the
basic model, given the researcher’s specialisation and capabilities, the distribution of results is exogenous.
10We discuss in Section 5 what happens if academic publication is delayed by commercialisation. In
our setup, publishing does not have any strategic eﬀect. If, instead of a single university researcher,
the producers of new technology were competing firms, publication could also be used as a strategic
instrument to aﬀect the R&D race (see for example Bar, 2006).
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output of quality q is given by µq.11’12 The parameter µ may be linked to the discipline;
engineering, for example, may have a higher µ than physical sciences. It may also reflect
the diﬃculty of finding a company interested in licensing inventions at this early stage of
development.
As the survey results of Jensen et al. (2003) confirm, faculty involvement in develop-
ment (even after a license is executed) is necessary for commercial success. Therefore we
assume that without this period of development, the idea does not have any commercial
value. By being involved in development, however, the researcher forgoes the opportunity
of undertaking new research and receiving a new idea in that period. In our setup, thus,
the conflict between academic rewards and commercial gains only appears in terms of the
time that development subtracts from conducting research. Research is motivated both
for fundamental scientific interest and commercial gain (pertaining thus to the “Pasteur’s
quadrant”). Moreover, the quality of the publications and the quality of the technology
developed are positively correlated.
When selling the innovation the researcher receives a share s (∈ (0, 1)) of the benefits
that accrue to the company. These benefits depend on the market value of the innovation
as well as on the costs of turning the innovation into a final commercial product. We
denote by A the cost of making the innovation a commercial product, that is assumed to
be paid by the firm. To make the problem interesting we need to assume that µQ > A
since, otherwise, it would never be interesting to develop any idea.13
11We assume in the basic setup that the applicability factor is certain. It would be equivalent to assume
that the commercial value is eµq, with eµ being an independently and identically distributed random factor
with E(eµ) = µ whose realisation is not observed until the end of the development period. The realisation
would not be relevant for the development decision. In Section 5 we extend the model to also allow for the
possibility that the researcher observes the realised commercial value at the end of the research period.
12We assume that when sold the quality of the innovation is verifiable. The literature on markets for
technology suggests the use of a menu of fixed fees and royalties or equity to signal the quality of the
invention or to separate bad applications of the technology from good ones (Gallini and Wright, 1990,
Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo, 1991, and Beggs, 1992).
13An alternative way to interpret our development period is having the researcher involved in a uni-
versity spin-oﬀ. In that case, A can be interpreted as the sunk-cost of creating the spin-oﬀ and s as the
shares received by the researcher. This is consistent with the contracts used for university spin-oﬀs. See
for example, Macho-Stadler et al. (2007).
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This model is infinitely repeated and time is discounted by δ (∈ (0, 1)).14 An advantage
of this formulation is that our results are not distorted by the existence of a final date. The
model, however, is not dynamic in the sense that there are no diﬀerences between periods,
i.e. there is neither learning from past research nor accumulation of capabilities over time.
While these dimensions are important, this paper aims, as a first step, at studying the
simplest situation where the university researchers are confronted with the research versus
development decision for an exogenous sequence of ex-ante identical research projects
(next section) and with the prior selection of projects (section thereafter).
3 Time Allocation
After obtaining an idea q in the previous period the researcher decides, at the beginning
of the new period, whether to develop this idea further into a potentially commercially
valuable innovation or to work on a new research project. This decision depends on the
expected market value of the idea and on the opportunity cost of the time to develop it.
To characterise the optimal allocation of time as a function of the exogenous parameters
we proceed in two steps. We first state the optimal decision as a function of any exogenous
“research continuation value” V , defined as the discounted present expected value of the
utility stream of a researcher at the beginning of a period in which she does research.
Lemma 1 For any research continuation value V , there is a unique q◦(V ) such that the
researcher will not develop if and only if q ≤ q◦(V ).
Proof. The researcher will be able to sell the innovation if the value for the firm is larger
than the costs. This defines two intervals, [0, Aµ ) and [
A
µ , Q], depending on the value of q.
If q < Aµ then the researcher will not develop for any V since she will never be able to sell
anyway, αq + δV ≥ αq + δ2V. If Aµ ≤ q ≤ Q then she will be able to sell the innovation if
she develops and therefore she will develop whenever αq + δs [µq −A] + δ2V ≤ αq + δV ,
or equivalently, when (1− δ)V ≥ s [µq −A].
14Infinite horizon models are indeed appropriate if after each period the player believes that the game
will continue for an additional period with some probability.
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Denoting m(q) ≡ s [µq −A], the previous discussion implies that, for all V , q◦(V ) is
given by m(q◦(V )) = (1 − δ)V when m(Q) > (1 − δ)V and q◦(V ) = Q when m(Q) ≤
(1− δ)V. Given that m(Q) > 0 (by assumption µQ−A > 0), in order to show that there
exists a unique q◦(V ), we need to show that m(q) is an increasing function and m(0) < 0.
Indeed, m0(q) = sµ > 0 and m(0) = −sA < 0.
For any exogenous continuation value, the researcher switches to a new research project
unless the output of the previous period has enough commercial prospects. We are now
ready to characterise the cutoﬀ q◦ and present value V as a function of the exogenous
parameters of the model. Denote as q the expected value of q.
Proposition 2 The optimal decision of the researcher is not to develop research output
whose quality q < q◦, where q◦ is defined as follows:
(a) q◦ = Q when αq ≥ s (µQ−A) .
(b) s (µq◦ −A) = αq + δsµ
R Q
q◦ (x− q
◦) dF (x) when αq < s (µQ−A) .
The discounted present expected value V for the researcher is,
V = 1
1−δ
h
αq + δsµ
R Q
q◦ (x− q◦) dF (x)
i
.
Proof. Suppose firstly that the cut-oﬀ chosen by the researcher is q◦ = Q. The researcher
never develops and never sells. Hence V =
R Q
0
αxdF (x) + δV , which simplifying gives
V = 1
1−δαq. The decision q
◦ = Q is optimal if and only if (1− δ)V ≥ s [µQ−A], which
substituting gives αq ≥ s (µQ−A) , which corresponds to the region in part (a).
Suppose secondly that the cut-oﬀ chosen by the researcher is q◦ < Q. We have that
V =
Z Q
0
αxdF (x) + δF (q◦)V + δs
Z Q
q◦
(µx−A) dF (x) + [1− F (q◦)] δ2V,
which simplifying gives
(1− δ) (1 + δ [1− F (q◦)])V = αq + δs
Z Q
q◦
(µx−A) dF (x).
On the other hand, q◦(V ) should be defined here as (1− δ)V = s [µq◦ −A]. Hence,
(1 + δ [1− F (q◦)]) s [µq◦ −A] = αq + δs
Z Q
q◦
(µx−A) dF (x).
Simplifying we have that q◦ is implicitly defined by
j(q◦) ≡ s (µq◦ −A)− δsµ
Z Q
q◦
(x− q◦) dF (x) = αq.
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Since j0(q) = sµ+ δsµ(1− F (q)) > 0, the cut-oﬀ q◦ is unique. Finally, we need to check
that q◦ ≤ Q. Since j(q◦) = αq and j0(q) > 0, we need that j(Q) ≥ αq or s (µQ−A) ≥ αq,
which corresponds to the region in part (b).
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is simple. First, if the (academic) value of the
average publication is, in monetary terms, higher than the payment from the best inno-
vation, the researcher will never develop an idea (part a). If this is not the case, then the
researcher will develop her best ideas while dropping the worse ones (part b). The quality
in which the researcher is indiﬀerent is such that the monetary reward after development
is equal to the expected opportunity cost of a period’s time; namely, the academic reward
of the average publication plus the expected monetary reward from an innovation derived
from a research output of higher quality.
From the previous equations, it is easy to show which changes of the exogenous pa-
rameters induce the researcher to develop more often; that is, when the region of part (a)
of Proposition 2 (in which the researcher never develops) shrinks and/or the threshold
within the region in part (b) (in which she might develop) is lower.
Corollary 3 The researcher develops more often, when
(a) the applicability factor, µ, increases;
(b) the costs of turning an innovation into a commercial product, A, decreases;
(c) the share of the benefits received by the researcher, s, increases;
(d) the marginal utility of the quality of the publication, α, decreases;
(e) the discount factor, δ, decreases.
As one would anticipate, a higher marginal commercial value of the innovation, µ,
and a lower cost of turning the innovation into a commercial product, A, induce more
development. Indeed, the empirical results by Thursby and Thursby (2007) confirm that
the probability that a researcher discloses in a given year is higher in more applied fields
such as engineering and in fields in which the results are in strong demand by the industry
such as biological sciences. Assuming that the marginal utility of academic publication α
decreases with tenure and age, part (c) is consistent with the fact that disclosure increases
with tenure and age, at least until the middle ages.
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More interestingly, if the future is little valued (δ low), then researchers do not lose
much from developing in this period and foregoing the possibility of obtaining a better
research outcome. As a result, they develop more often. An alternative interpretation of
the discount rate δ is the rate at which ideas are obtained. The corollary implies that a
more prolific researcher (with a high δ) should be more reluctant to develop a given idea.
Although she might end up developing more or less in total, the commercial value of her
average innovation should definitely be higher.
Also intuitively, stronger commercial incentives (a higher s) and a lower emphasis
in publications (a lower α) induce more development. The combination (α, s) would be
determined by the university and would depend on the university objectives, a matter
that is beyond the aim of this paper. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that for the
incentive to commercialise inventions to be eﬀective, it is necessary that the parameters
satisfy αq ≥ s [µQ−A] or q
[µQ−A] <
s
α . Still there might be a minimum α established by
competition for researchers and/or a maximum s coming from the relationship with the
market. Hence, whenever q
[µQ−A] is very high, either because the quality of the area of
research is very high or because the discipline has not marketable applications, it may
not be possible to provide incentives to commercialise.
So far we have assumed that all researchers were obtaining ideas from the same pool.
However, better researchers might have access to better pools. In order to understand
whether better researchers develop more or less often we briefly suppose that diﬀerent
researchers have access to pools that diﬀer in the support of the distribution, [∆, Q+∆]
for some ∆ ≥ 0. Better researchers should have a higher ∆, i.e. they obtain ideas from a
pool that first-order stochastically dominates the pool of worse researchers. For simplicity,
for any ∆, the distribution of quality is assumed to be uniform.
Corollary 4 Assume that the research output is uniformly distributed over [∆, Q + ∆]
for ∆ ≥ 0. Better researchers (higher ∆) develop more often if and only if α
2
< sµ.
Proof. The optimal cutoﬀ in part (b) in Proposition 2 for a uniform distribution function
between [∆, Q+∆] is given by G(q◦, Q,∆) = 0 where
G(q,Q,∆) ≡ s (µq −A)− αQ+∆
2
− sδµ
2Q
(Q+∆− q)2 .
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The researcher develops more often when getting better results as long as ∂∂∆(Q +
∆ − q◦) > 0 or as long as ∂∂∆q◦ < 1. Applying the implicit function theorem, we have
that ∂G∂∆ = −
sδµ
2Q 2 (Q+∆− q) − α
1
2
and ∂G∂q = sµ +
sδµ
2Q (Q+∆− q) and therefore
∂q◦
∂∆ =
− ∂G∂∆/
∂G
∂q < 1 as long as
sδµ
2Q 2 (Q+∆− q)+α
1
2
< sµ+ sδµ
2Q (Q+∆− q), which is equivalent
to α
2
< sµ.
Gifted with research outputs of higher academic value, a researcher should on the one
hand have more incentives to do more research and therefore develop less because her
ideas have a higher academic value. On the other hand, she should have more incentives
to develop because patents would also be more lucrative. The academic and commercial
marginal values determine which eﬀect is stronger. Indeed, in an institution with a low
emphasis in publications and a high in development (case α/2 < sµ in Corollary 4), better
researchers develop more.15 In contrast in an institution more prone to reward academic
excellence, better researchers should be those that develop less.
The previous corollary also hints at the dynamic consequences of working in a research
or business oriented university. If one assumes that more senior researchers obtain better
research output, the previous proposition predicts that researchers in research-oriented
institutions will devote more and more time to research as time goes by. In contrast,
senior researchers in more business oriented institutions or in more applied fields should
devote more time to development than junior ones. We are not aware of any empirical
test along these lines, although there is evidence that scientists become on average less
productive as they get older (Stephan and Levin, 1992 and Jones, 2005).
4 Basic or Applied Research Projects
We now turn to the controversial question of how the introduction of commercial remu-
neration aﬀects the choice of research projects. As argued in the introduction one of the
main diﬀerences between basic and applied projects is that basic projects are riskier than
applied projects. Although there is a continuous spectrum of scientific activity, moving
15Debackere and Veugelers (2005) show that top generators of new technology ventures and industrial
contract volumes in the KU of Leuven in Belgium also tend to be among the top performers in terms of
academic research. Similar results are obtained by Calderini et al. (2007) and Stephan et al. (2007).
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from the applied-science end of the spectrum to the basic-science end, the degree of un-
certainty about the results of specific research projects increases (Nelson, 1959). In what
follows, we will show that according to this distinction, researchers will be more willing
to choose projects that are more basic in nature. In order to isolate the eﬀects of this dif-
ference, suppose that the researcher can costlessly choose the level of risk of her research
projects, assuming that the mean and the support of the distribution are identical. In the
next section, we consider other potential diﬀerences between basic and applied research.
Proposition 5 The introduction of remuneration for commercial inventions induces re-
searchers to select riskier projects (“more basic”). By choosing riskier projects, researchers
are more reluctant to develop a given outcome, although they might develop more or less
in expected terms.
Proof. To prove this result, consider two distributions, F1(q) and F2(q), with the same
support [0, Q] and with the same mean (q), and F2(q) being a mean preserving spread of
(i.e. riskier than) F1(q). By definition,
R
u(x)dF2(x) ≥
R
u(x)dF1(x) for any u(x) defined
in R+, non-decreasing and non-concave. Given that u(x) = 0 if x [0, q] and u(x) = x− q
if x [q,Q] satisfies these conditions, we have that
R Q
q (x− q) dF2(x) ≥
R Q
q (x− q) dF1(x).
In other words, F1(x) second-order stochastically dominates F2(x).
If s is small, the parameters of the model are in the region of part (a) of Proposition
2. In this region, the researcher is indiﬀerent between the two distributions. If s is high
enough, the parameters are in the region of part (b). Given F1(q), the threshold quality
qo1 is defined as:
s (µqo1 −A)− δsµ
Z Q
qo1
(x− qo1) dF1(x) = αq.
Since F2(.) is a mean preserving spread of F1(.), we have that
s (µqo1 −A)− δsµ
Z Q
qo1
(x− qo1) dF2(x) < αq.
Given that the derivative of the left hand with respect to qo1 is positive and that
s (µqo2 −A)− δsµ
Z Q
qo2
(x− qo2) dF2(x) = αq,
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Figure 1: Researcher’s utility in a given period (for a given V) as a function of the quality
of the idea.
we have that qo2 > q
o
1. As shown in the proof of the previous proposition, this implies that
V2 > V1 and therefore the researcher prefers the risky research project.
The intuition behind the preference for the risky project follows from the fact that
the researcher acts as if she was risk-loving with respect to the quality of the output.
As we can see in Figure 1, researcher’s utility as a function of the output quality is a
convex function. Indeed, for a given V , the utility is the maximum of two aﬃne functions
that represent the value from continuing doing research (αq + δV ) and the value from
development (αq + δs [µq −A] + δ2V ). The latter is steeper because better output have
higher development value. The former has a higher intercept because the researcher
obtains a new idea sooner. As shown in Proposition 2, as long as the remuneration for
the best innovation is high enough, the two lines cross at some point qo.
By choosing riskier projects, researchers are more reluctant to develop a given idea.
Indeed, they are more likely to obtain a better idea in the next period and therefore they
are more willing to drop the current one. As shown in Figure 2, though, they might
end up developing more ideas in expected terms. Although F2(x) is a mean preserving
spread of F1(x) and therefore the threshold for the former is higher (qo2 > q
o
1), the ex-ante
probability of developing is higher for the former than it is for the latter (F2(qo2) < F1(q
o
1)).
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Figure 2: Distribution F1(·) and a mean preserving spread, F2(·) (Area A=Area B).
Although the academic and commercial rewards were assumed to be linearly increasing
in the quality of the output, this result should hold more generally. Indeed, the intro-
duction of commercial rewards induce the researcher to select between two increasing
functions. Assume that the commercial value of an idea of quality q is µ(q)q. Given that
the best innovations have much higher value than intermediate ones, µ(q) would typically
be not constant as in our model but increasing. This would make the researcher even
more risk-loving than with no rewards from technology transfer. Further, the fact that
the researcher selects riskier projects than with no commercial rewards should hold if the
value of publications has the form α(q)q for any α(q) and not only when α(q) is constant.
Indeed, although she might not always act as if she was risk-loving she would exhibit more
risk-loving behaviour than before the introduction of commercial rewards.
5 Extensions
5.1 Increased Secrecy
There is evidence that a delay in scientific publication has occurred on results that have
been the subject of a patent application (see e.g. Geuna and Nesta, 2006). To analyse how
this dimension might aﬀect our results, we assume in this subsection that if the research
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outcome is to be developed, the researcher cannot publish it in a scientific journal until
the end of the development period. To make things interesting, we need to assume here
that the loss from delaying publication until the next period is lower than the monetary
value from development (i.e., δsµ > (1 − δ)α). Otherwise, the researcher would never
develop. Following the same procedure as before, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 6 The optimal decision of the researcher is not to develop research output
whose quality q < qs, where qs is defined as follows:
(a) qs = Q when δαq ≥ sδ (µQ−A)− (1− δ)αQ.
(b) s [µqs −A] = αq+ (1−δ)δ αqs+
R Q
qs (δsµ− (1− δ)α) (x− q◦) dF (x) when δαq <
sδ (µQ−A)− (1− δ)αQ.
The discounted present expected value V for the researcher is,
V = 1
(1−δ)
h
αq +
R Q
qs (δsµ− (1− δ)α) (x− qs) dF (x)
i
.
That is, the marginal idea is such that the monetary value at the end of the period
is equal to the opportunity cost of time, equal to the average value of a research output,
the lost value of publishing later, and the lost possibility of having a better output, which
can be developed but of course at the cost of delaying publication one period.
The following corollary shows that although the researcher develop less than if devel-
opment does not delay publication, she still prefers a riskier (i.e. more basic) project.
Corollary 7 The researcher develops less often and she is worse oﬀ when there is in-
creased secrecy. She would still choose to select riskier rather than safer projects.
As we can see in the dashed lines in Figure 3, publication delay makes development
less attractive. As a result the researcher develops less often (qs > q◦). Further, she would
still select riskier rather than safer projects because the utility is still convex (remember
that sδµ > (1− δ)α). However, she acts as she was less risk-loving than before. Although
the introduction of commercial incentives still induces research that is more basic in the
presence of delay, the eﬀect is weaker than without delay. More generally, if the researcher
were risk-averse, she might be more prone to select safer or more applied projects than in
the case of no secrecy.
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Figure 3: Researcher’s utility in a given period with (dashed line) and without secrecy.
5.2 Further diﬀerences between basic and applied research
Another potential diﬀerence between basic and more applied research projects is that
the outcomes of applied projects can be more easily commercialised or, in other words,
the costs A of turning the innovation into a commercial product are lower. Also, peer
recognition and the expected value of publication (measured by the parameter α) can be
lower for more applied projects. The next proposition confirms that, according to this
distinction, researchers will be more likely to choose applied projects in the presence of
commercial incentives.
Proposition 8 The introduction of remuneration for commercial inventions is conducive
to a selection of projects with lower costs of development and lower academic value (“more
basic”). By choosing these projects, researchers spend more time in development and less
in research.
Propositions 5 and 8 identify two opposite eﬀects of commercial incentives on the
choice of research projects. Commercial rewards induce a shift towards more applied or
towards more basic depending on which of these two eﬀects is stronger. Of course, if
more applied projects have much lower development costs, then researchers choose more
applied research projects even if they are less risky. On the other hand, researchers choose
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research projects that are riskier if the diﬀerence in development costs is not large. That
is, commercial incentives should not necessarily “skew” research towards more applied
projects, as the recent evidence mentioned in the introduction also seems to suggest. In
the next section, we investigate whether this depends on the fact that we have so far
assumed that commercialisation does not delay publication.
5.3 Random development value
Our basic model assumes that the development factor is certain. As mentioned in footnote
11, however, it would also allow for the possibility that the development factor is random,
as long as the realisation is not observed until the end of the period of development. Both
are equivalent given that only the expectation (and not the realisation) is relevant for
the development/research decision. It might be, however, that the researcher realises the
commercial value of a piece of knowledge at the end of the research period, when she also
realises its quality. In this subsection, we assume that the development factor is random
but determined at the end of the research period. We consider, for simplicity, the binary
case: the development factor µ is equal to µl with probability p and equal to µh with
probability 1 − p, where µl < µh. Also for notational simplicity, we restrict the set of
exogenous parameter values to ensure that at least some ideas are developed (part b in
proposition 2).
Proposition 9 The optimal decision of the researcher is not to develop output of quality
q < q◦h if µ = µh and q < q
◦
l if µ = µl where q
◦
h and q
◦
l are such that µhq
◦
h = µlq
◦
l and
s (µlq
◦
l −A) = αq + pδsµl
R Q
q◦l
(x− q◦l ) dF (x) + (1− p)δsµh
R Q
q◦h
(x− q◦h) dF (x) .
The discounted present expected value V for the researcher is,
V = 1
1−δ
h
αq + pδsµl
R Q
q◦l
(x− q◦l ) dF (x) + (1− p)δsµh
R Q
q◦h
(x− q◦h) dF (x)
i
.
From the definition of the threshold quality values, it is easy to see that q◦h < q
◦
l .
Intuitively, the researcher tends to develop ideas that turn out to have higher commercial
value. If might be that a piece of knowledge of a given quality q is developed if it turns
out to have a high commercial value (µ = µh) but not if it has a low one (µ = µh). This
occurs if q◦h < q < q
◦
l .
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In order to analyse the eﬀects of an increase in the commercialisation risk, as in the
previous section, we concentrate on the case where p = 1/2 and µh = µ+ε and µl = µ−ε
so that E(µ) is constant and equal to µ for any ε.16 While keeping the expectation
constant, a greater ε would imply a riskier commercialisation value and therefore a more
basic project. Intuitively, the commercial value of more basic projects is more diﬃcult to
predict, while for more applied projects it is easier to anticipate.
Corollary 10 The introduction of remuneration for commercial inventions induces re-
searchers to select riskier projects in terms of their commercial value (“more basic”).
6 Concluding Remarks
Many firms and industries rely heavily on knowledge originating from universities and
other public research institutions. In order to foster the transfer of knowledge, the gov-
ernments of many advanced economies have recently transferred the ownership of patents
emanating from public funds to the universities and part of the proceeds to the inventors.
Although this has increased the number and the value of university patents, many people
worry about the long-term side eﬀects of commercial incentives in academia. Some groups
have expressed concerns about the possibility that academic faculty “skews” the nature of
their research, selecting applied rather than basic research projects, and therefore putting
the future of the industrial base at stake. This paper analyses some of the “unintended”
eﬀects of government policies that increase the incentives to transfer university research
into the market, such as the Bayh-Dole Act, in particular we discuss whether financial
incentives aimed at promoting commercialisation aﬀects the choice of research projects.
To understand the behaviour of university researchers, we build a simple repeated
model to study the allocation of time as a function of the individual characteristics and
of the academic and market incentives. We show that the researcher should pursue a new
research project unless the quality of the outcome has enough commercial prospects to
compensate a delay in undertaking new research. The opportunity costs of development
16Other papers have also analysed project selection when projects diﬀer on their variance. In Cabral
(2003), for example, two firms competing in R&D have to choose between two projects, one of which is
a mean-preserving spread of the other.
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and commercialisation include not only scientific output but also the opportunity to obtain
a more lucrative innovation. Consistent with the empirical evidence, our comparative
statics results indicate that a researcher spends more time developing if her discipline has
greater applicability and if the marginal utility of academic publications is lower.
We also analyse how the coexistence of publications and technology transfer rewards
aﬀects the choice between basic and applied research programs. We show that the in-
troduction of researcher remuneration for commercial inventions pushes the researcher to
prefer riskier projects. Given that higher levels of uncertainty are related to more basic
research, the introduction of commercial rewards might not only preserve but also enhance
the choice of more basic research projects. As a result, although less time might now be
spent on research, this research might be more basic in nature than before.
Our model is not only consistent with a variety of stylised facts but it also generates
a number of additional testable predictions. On the development side, by choosing riskier
projects, researchers should be more reluctant to develop research of a low quality. Instead,
they are more willing to continue undertaking research because they are more likely to
obtain results of higher quality in the future. As a result, it might be that they end up
developing less as commercial rewards increase. Indirect evidence from this can also be
found in Thursby and Thursby (2007), who state that “the much publicized increase in
licensing activity appears to be concentrated among a minority of faculty”. We predict
however that the commercial value of the projects that are actually developed is higher.
Again, indirect evidence suggests that most of the patenting revenues are concentrated
among a reduced number of patents. Although the level of invention disclosures, patent
applications and licenses executed increased by 84%, 238% and 161% respectively from
1991 until 2000, the royalty revenue increased by 520% in the same period.
On the research side, a selection of riskier projects should lead to a more spread dis-
tribution of the quality of the publications. Empirically, one could analyse whether the
quality of the publications, measured for example in citations, of researchers in depart-
ments in which commercial rewards are larger is more spread.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 6
Again, the researcher never expects to sell the innovation if q < Aµ . If
A
µ ≤ q ≤ Q
she will develop whenever δαq + δs [µq −A] + δ2V ≥ αq + δV , or equivalently, when
δ(1− δ)V ≤ sδ [µq −A]− (1− δ)αq.
For any continuation value V , there is again a unique qs(V ) such that the researcher
will not develop. This is the case if and only if q ≤ qs(V ). Indeed, denoting m(q) ≡
sδ [µq −A]− (1− δ)αq, for any V , qs(V ) is given by m(qs(V )) = δ(1− δ)V when m(Q) >
δ(1− δ)V and qs(V ) = Q when m(Q) ≤ δ(1−δ)V. Given that m0(q) = sδµ− (1− δ)α > 0
and m(0) = −sA < 0 there exists a unique qs(V ).
Now, suppose firstly that the cut-oﬀ chosen by the researcher is qs = Q. The researcher
never develops and never sells. Hence, V =
R Q
0
αxdF (x)+δV , which simplifying gives V =
1
1−δαq. The decision q
s = Q is optimal if and only if δ(1−δ)V ≥ sδ [µQ−A]−(1−δ)αQ,
which substituting gives δαq ≥ sδ (µQ−A)− (1− δ)αQ, which corresponds to the region
in part (a).
Suppose secondly that the cut-oﬀ chosen by the researcher is qs < Q. Since she sells
if and only if she develops, we have that
V =
Z qs
0
αxdF (x)+ δ
Z Q
qs
αxdF (x)+ δF (qs)V + δs
Z Q
qs
(µx−A) dF (x)+ [1− F (qs)] δ2V,
which simplifying gives
(1− δ) (1 + δ [1− F (qs)])V =
Z qs
0
αxdF (x) + δ
Z Q
qs
αxdF (x) + δs
Z Q
qs
(µx−A) dF (x).
On the other hand, the optimal qs(V ) should be defined as δ(1 − δ)V = sδ [µqs −A] −
(1− δ)αqs. Substituting in the previous equation and simplifying,
s [µqs −A] = αq + (1− δ)
δ
αqs +
Z Q
qs
(δsµ− (1− δ)α) (x− qs) dF (x).
In other words, qs is implicitly defined by g(qs) = 0, where
g(qs) ≡ s [µqs −A]−αq−
Z Q
qs
δsµ (x− qs) dF (x)−(1− δ)
δ
αqs+
Z Q
qs
(1−δ)α (x− qs) dF (x) = 0.
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We have that g0(q) > 0 and g(0) < 0. Indeed,
g0(q) =
1
δ
£
δsµ+ δ2sµ(1− F (qs))− α(1− δ) + δ(1− δ)α [1− F (qs)]
¤
> 0
and
g(0) = s(−A)− αq −
Z Q
0
δsµxdF (x) +
Z Q
0
(1− δ)αxdF (x) < 0,
because of our initial assumption (sδµ− (1− δ)α > 0). In order to have a unique cutoﬀ
qs we need that
g(Q) =
1
δ
(δs [µQ−A]− δαq − (1− δ)αQ) > 0,
which corresponds to the region in part (b).
Substituting,
V =
1
(1− δ)
·
αq +
Z Q
qs
(δsµ− (1− δ)α) (x− qs) dF (x)
¸
.
Proof of Corollary 7
The cut-oﬀ point of our baseline case q◦ satisfies
s [µq◦ −A]− αq −
Z Q
q◦
δsµ (x− q◦) dF (x) = 0,
and therefore, in particular,
q◦ −
Z Q
q◦
δ (x− q◦) dF (x) > 0.
We have that g(q◦) < 0, where g(·) is defined in the previous proof, because
g(q◦) =
(1− δ)
δ
α
·
−q◦ + δ
Z Q
q◦
(x− q◦) dF (x)
¸
< 0.
Therefore, given that g is increasing and at q◦ is negative and at qs is 0, we have that
q◦ < qs.
We have that V s < V ◦ if and only ifZ Q
qs
(δsµ− (1− δ)α) (x− qs) dF (x) <
Z Q
q◦
δsµ (x− q◦) dF (x),
which is true if and only ifZ Q
qs
δsµ (x− qs) dF (x)−
Z Q
q◦
δsµ (x− q◦) dF (x)−
Z Q
qs
(1− δ)α (x− qs) dF (x) < 0.
22
Defining n(q) ≡
R Q
q δsµ (x− q) dF (x) and given that n
0(q) = −δsµ (1− F (q)) < 0, we
have that the first two terms are negative and so is the third.
To prove that researchers still prefer riskier projects, consider as before two distribu-
tions, F1(q) and F2(q), with the same support and the latter being a mean preserving
spread of the former. In the region of part (a), the researcher is indiﬀerent between the
two distributions. In the region of part (b), given F1(q), the threshold quality qs1 is defined
as:
s [µqs1 −A]− αq −
(1− δ)
δ
αqs1 −
Z Q
qs1
(δsµ− (1− δ)α) (x− qs1) dF1(x) = 0.
Since F2(.) is a mean preserving spread of F1(.), we have that
s [µqs1 −A]− αq −
(1− δ)
δ
αqs1 −
Z Q
qs1
(δsµ− (1− δ)α) (x− qs1) dF2(x) < 0.
Given that the derivative of the left hand side is equal to
sµ− (1− δ)
δ
α+ (δsµ− (1− δ)α) (1− F2(qs1)) > 0,
and that
s [µqs2 −A]− αq −
(1− δ)
δ
αqs2 −
Z Q
qs2
(δsµ− (1− δ)α) (x− qs2) dF2(x) = 0,
we have that qs2 > q
s
1. From Proposition 6, V =
1
(1−δ)
h
s [µqs −A]− (1−δ)δ αqs
i
, and hence
we have that V2 > V1 and therefore the researcher prefers the risky pool.
Proof of Proposition 8
To prove this result, suppose that there are two projects characterised by the parameters
(α1, A1) and (α2, A2), with A1 > A2 and α1 > α2, but otherwise identical. Project 1
is more basic than project 2. According to Proposition 2, we can write the discounted
present expected value for each project i = 1, 2 as
Vi(s) =
1
1− δ [s (µq
◦
i (s)−Ai)] ,
where Vi and q◦i are functions of the share s. The researcher prefers the applied project
(project 2) if and only if
q◦1(s)− q◦2(s) <
A1 −A2
µ
.
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From Proposition 2 and Corollary 3, one can show that ∂
2qo
∂s∂α < 0 and
∂2qo
∂s∂A < 0. As
a consequence, q◦1(s
0) − q◦2(s0) < q◦1(s00) − q◦2(s00) whenever s0 > s00. This implies that the
researcher is more inclined to choose the applied project the larger is the share s. Indeed,
if she chooses project 2 when the share is s00, she will keep preferring that project for the
larger share s0. However, the increase in s can make the researcher switch from project 1
to project 2. The second part of the Proposition follows directly from Corollary 3.
Proof of Proposition 9
Following a similar procedure to the proof of Proposition 6, we can find q◦h, q
◦
l , and V as
described in the text.
Proof of Corollary 10
By taking the derivative of V (as defined in the proposition) with respect to ε and sub-
stituting p = 1/2, µh = µ+ ε and µl = µ− ε, we obtain
2(1− δ)
sδ
dV
dε
= −
Z Q
q◦l
(x− q◦l ) dF (x) +
Z Q
q◦h
(x− q◦h) dF (x)− (µ− ε) [1− F (q◦l )]
dq◦l
dε
(1)
−(µ+ ε) [1− F (q◦h)]
dq◦h
dε
(2)
From the other definition of V , V = s
1−δ (µlq
◦
l −A) we have
1− δ
s
dV
dε
= −q◦l + (µ− ε)
dq◦l
dε
(3)
and therefore
2 (1− δ)
δs
dV
dε
= −2
δ
q◦l +
2
δ
(µ− ε)dq
◦
l
dε
Denoting B = −
R Q
q◦l
(x− q◦l ) dF (x)+
R Q
q◦h
(x− q◦h) dF (x) > 0 and equalizing the derivatives
(1) and (3) we have
dq◦l
dε
=
δB(µ+ ε) + 2q◦l [[1− F (q◦h)]µδ + (µ+ ε)]
[2 + δ [2− F (q◦h)− F (q◦l )]] (µ− ε)(µ+ ε)
From the definition of q◦h in the proposition, and diﬀerentiating with respect to ε, we have
also that
dq◦h
dε
=
−2µq◦l + (µ− ε)(µ+ ε)
dq◦l
dε
(µ+ ε)2
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By substituting dq
◦
l
dε by the derivative above, and then substituting
dq◦h
dε and
dq◦l
dε in (1) and
simplifying, we conclude that the sign of (1) is the same as the sign of
(µ+ ε)
"
−
Z Q
q◦l
xdF (x) +
Z Q
q◦h
xdF (x)
#
= (µ+ ε)
Z q◦l
q◦h
xdF (x) > 0.
Hence, V increases with ε which gives our result.
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